

27  
**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

ENDC/PV.99  
18 February 1963  
ENGLISH

---

MAY 11 1963

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday 18 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. MACOVESCU

(Romania)

63-06801

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. A. de MELO FRANCO  
Mr. R. L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. S. F. RAE  
Mr. J. E. G. HARDY  
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. V. PECHOTA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij MIKAEL IMRU  
ATO M. HAMID  
ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL  
Mr. A. S. MEHTA  
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA REGHINI  
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU  
Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. R. HOSZOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C. H. von PLATEN  
Mr. S. LÖFGREN  
Mr. ULF ERICSSON

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. V. KUZNETSOV  
Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. L. J. MENDELEVICH  
Mr. B. J. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN  
Mr. S. AHMED  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODEER  
Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J. G. TAHOUDIN  
Mr. J. K. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER  
Mr. C. C. STELLE  
Mr. D. E. MARK  
Mr. V. BAKER

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): I declare open the ninety-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I have pleasure in welcoming the representative of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, who has been associated with the work of our Committee before.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your words of welcome.

During the present general debate the Polish delegation would like to make a few remarks on the future work of the Committee on Disarmament. It cannot be denied that the events of recent months, and more especially the Caribbean crisis, have more than ever emphasized the importance of the tasks before us. We must reach as soon as possible an agreement which will appreciably reduce and in time eliminate completely the danger of nuclear conflict. However, in order to gain positive results certain conditions must be fulfilled. First of all, it is essential that no State should resort to measures likely to create faits accomplis and to aggravate international tension. It must not be forgotten that the disarmament negotiations are not taking place in a vacuum. Every political act which increases international tension is bound to accelerate the armaments race and increase distrust in international relations. It goes without saying that such an atmosphere will not help the disarmament negotiations.

On this subject we are forced to note with regret that the events of recent weeks and the measures taken by the Western Powers are not likely to facilitate our task. The Nassau Agreement opening a new chapter in the armaments of Western Europe, and the essentially militarist pact concluded between France and the German Federal Republic, are exceptionally serious acts which not only do not bring an agreement on disarmament any nearer but, on the contrary, stimulate the already monstrous arms race. It suffices to say that execution of the idea of a so-called multilateral force, and military co-operation under the pact concluded between France and the German Federal Republic, though based on different elements, both help the German Federal Republic towards nuclear armaments.

In other words, the Western Powers' policy as a whole, in spite of the growing contradictions which rend them, still plays into the hands of the State which seeks, by the possession of the most murderous weapon, to strengthen its policy of revenge in Europe. It is impossible to accept the proposition that the military plans of

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

NATO are simply an adaptation to new technical conditions. In fact we have here a qualitative political change which cannot fail to reinforce the most aggressive elements and tendencies within this alliance. It is characteristic that the United States is openly bidding certain of its allies enlarge their armaments.

In this situation the moment seems to have come when we must go beyond the stage of a confrontation of ideas and points of view. What is necessary is to close the gap between our positions. Now that we are beginning a new stage in our discussions, we must draw all the conclusions from the earlier stages necessary for concrete solutions. This requires a will to succeed which must be manifested in flexibility, ability to abandon out-of-date positions, and willingness to put forward new ideas. The Socialist members of the Committee have given many proofs that they regard the solution of the problems before us in this way. The Soviet Union has demonstrated its willingness to consider the results of earlier discussions and to incorporate in its own proposals those ideas and suggestions of the Western Powers and the non-aligned countries which lead towards a solution --- and these are not simply drafting or minor amendments. Thus the socialist countries, while declaring themselves in favour of general and complete disarmament within the shortest possible time, have agreed that the period of execution of the treaty on general and complete disarmament shall be extended from four to five years (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.2).

The Soviet Union has also seen its way to agree to a more modest reduction in armed forces during the first stage of disarmament. It has accepted the principle of percentage reduction of conventional armaments. It has agreed to include in the first stage of disarmament measures for reducing the risk of war (ENDC/48). Last but not least, it took an important step forward when, wishing to rescue the negotiations from deadlock, it proposed last September that the two nuclear great Powers should retain a certain number of missiles with nuclear warheads until the end of the second stage of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art.5, p.5). Thus the Soviet Union gave up its demand for the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage of disarmament, thus bringing its position nearer to the unchanging requirements of the Western Powers. That is the list of the constructive proposals made by the socialist States.

Although we are sure that to eliminate the danger of nuclear war requires the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage of disarmament, we supported the Soviet Union's attitude because it facilitated a new approach to the

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

solution of this problem and might rescue our negotiations from deadlock. I am forced with regret to note that until now the Western Powers have been trying to submerge the discussion of this important proposal in a flood of technical questions relating to minor details.

What have the Western Powers contributed? Unfortunately their contribution is not even modest. The amendments introduced by the United States delegation during the Geneva negotiations to limit the production of armaments during the first stage of disarmament (ENDC/30/Add.1, and ENDC/69, p.2), and the new provisions for passage from one stage of disarmament to another (ENDC/30/Add.2), though they constituted a step forward from the previous Western positions, are relatively minor and do not change at all the essence of the American conception of disarmament. This conception still means making quantitative reductions while retaining the means of starting a nuclear conflict.

Our Committee faces once more the problem of cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Important progress seemed to have been made recently in this field, and a final agreement seemed near. Indeed, the exchange of letters between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and the President of the United States (ENDC/73, ENDC/74) gave a new impetus to the negotiations. The conversations between the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom which followed this exchange of letters demonstrated unfortunately that our optimism was premature. How do matters stand? It must be noted that we still face the Western Powers method of negotiation, which is to try to use the other side's readiness to compromise in order to impose their own views.

We remember that at the end of last year the Soviet Union expressed its agreement to install three automatic seismic stations on its territory (ENDC/PV.90, p.15). It later expressed its agreement that an international control staff should participate in the installation of these stations (ENDC/73, p.4). It also accepted the principle of on-site inspection by agreeing to a quota of two or three inspections a year (ibid., p.5). These proposals were submitted, not because control by national systems would be inadequate, but merely in order to bring the positions of the two sides together and reach an agreement in the shortest possible time. According to the Soviet Union's proposals, an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests would be guaranteed by a control system composed of an international centre, national detection

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

and identification systems including stations situated outside the territory of the nuclear Powers, automatic stations whose installation and functioning would be controlled with the participation of an international staff, and on-site inspections of suspicious phenomena.

Are all these systems not more than sufficient to ensure the observance of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests? The insistence by the Western Powers upon a still vaster control system is bound to raise serious doubt of their motives. This judgment seems all the better founded since the United States resumed underground nuclear weapon tests in breach of the resolution (A/RES/1762(XVII); ENDC/63) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its last session. In so doing it flouted the principles proposed by the non-aligned States (ENDC/28), and the demands made in this Committee and the United Nations General Assembly that nuclear weapon tests should cease for good on 1 January 1963. I am bound to say that this does a grave injury to all the nations and to the cause of peace. We are certain that there is no longer anything to prevent an agreement which would eliminate for ever all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. What is needed is the political will to reach one. The Soviet Union has on many occasions given proof of such willingness; the Western Powers ought to show similar sentiments.

It seems to me to be our general opinion that, while we should not lose sight of our principal objective, which is to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament, we can and should immediately take measures to reduce international tension, to halt the arms race, and to reverse the dangerous current which is carrying humanity towards a nuclear war. The possibilities exist. We are thinking of measures placed before our Committee long ago, and also of the new proposals presented on the resumption of our work. First of all, we should take every step likely to prevent any increase in the danger of a nuclear conflict. This applies above all to strategic nuclear weapons. Special measures are required for this purpose. The Polish delegation therefore supports the draft declaration (ENDC/75) submitted by the Soviet Union delegation renouncing the installation in foreign territory of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

The Polish delegation also considers that the time has come to begin a serious discussion on the problem of creating denuclearized zones. Support for this idea is growing. I need only mention the debate which took place during the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. It showed that an ever-growing number of



(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

countries regard this measure as an effective means for halting the nuclear arms race, for reducing the danger of a nuclear conflict, and for increasing collective security. Denuclearized zones can, of course be created in different areas of the world. However, it seems to us that they should be established first of all in territories where there are already nuclear weapons or which are likely soon to become nuclear bases. This is why we consider that the creation of a denuclearized zone in central Europe is particularly important. The Polish delegation, as everyone knows, submitted a memorandum on this subject (ENDC/C.1/1) to the Committee on 28 March last year, and we hope that it will be carefully examined.

The debates of the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of Less Developed Areas throughout the world are taking place in this very building. The subjects which are occupying the attention of men of science from all countries of the world are in fact closely linked with the problems we are called upon to solve. Modern science has given us the means to ensure the material and spiritual wellbeing of all the inhabitants of our planet; but it has also given humanity the means of spreading through the world the scourges of death and destruction. The men of science meeting in Geneva, conscious of their responsibility towards humanity, have addressed a solemn appeal to us. They ask us not to spare any effort to reduce the differences which separate us. They call upon us to help to set free for the service of life the considerable means now devoted to the production of instruments of death. We cannot remain unmoved by this appeal.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): My delegation welcomes the resumption of the work of our Committee, and expresses the hope that this new round will prove to be an historic milestone on the road to the suspension of all tests, for it is mainly in that field that agreement is almost in sight. It is for that reason that we cannot afford to let this opportunity slip away. The bulk of my remarks today will therefore be devoted to the burning issue of tests.

First I should like to extend a hearty welcome to our new colleagues around this table. We want particularly to welcome our new co-Chairmen and to wish them success in their many tasks, and above all in their supreme mission. For our part we feel that the presence here of Mr. Foster and Mr. Kuznetsov is very encouraging and should give new impetus to our talks. We hope they will be able to stay among us as long as is necessary.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

It is significant that this round, like its predecessor, should come on the heels of an extremely important and eventful recess, which was put to great profit by the nuclear Powers. I intend to dwell on this aspect of the test ban situation at more length, but before I do that I should like to refer to another aspect of the matter. As one of the non-nuclear, non-aligned Powers, we too naturally also tried during the recess to think about the latest developments, not only from our vantage point but from the viewpoint possibly of the whole non-nuclear, non-aligned world, which we feel that we, along with the other seven, are entitled to represent in this Committee. And we think it is our duty to convey to the nuclear Powers the views of that segment of the world, which feels very strongly against the hazards of nuclear tests, to which it may be more exposed than the nuclear Powers themselves.

It is with a sigh of relief that humanity has noticed a marked relaxation in world tension following upon the Soviet Union's withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba. It can be said also that the germs of increased or renewed confidence and practical co-operation between the two camps were planted on that occasion. The first series of correspondence exchanged between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy marked the beginning of a new era in practical, direct and high-level world diplomacy in which both leaders played a very statesmanlike and astute role. We should try therefore to be guided by the same spirit in our search for solutions to test ban problems.

The second series of such correspondence, initiated by Mr. Khrushchev's letter (ENDC/73) of 19 December, went even further in the development of this highly fruitful and pragmatic diplomacy. That second exchange of correspondence gave rise to the expectation and the hope that finally humanity was on the verge of a statesmanlike and a truly humanitarian break-through, away from the maze of scientific entanglement and through the wall of political resistance which had previously impeded our progress.

In order properly to evaluate the meaning of Mr. Khrushchev's latest offer, it should be interesting to ponder here the words of Mr. Godber, Minister of State of the United Kingdom, when he appealed to the Soviet Union on 20 November 1962 in the following explicit, new and highly relevant terms. He said:

"We could have a complete comprehensive treaty, and all that is necessary for that is for the Soviet Union to revert -- not to accept anything new, but to revert ---- to accepting something which a year ago, here in this building, our Soviet colleague renounced: in other words, to accept again the principle of obligatory on-site inspection." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.44, p.11)

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Mr. Godber went on to say:

"That is all we need --- a very small number of on-site inspections a year. If that were conceded by the Soviet Union, if it were to revert to the position it held until 28 November last year, then I believe we could quickly reach a comprehensive test ban." (ibid.)

We are grateful to see that the Soviet Union did just that. Indeed, our Soviet colleagues say that they have gone even further owing to the change of circumstances and the development of new detection techniques. In our opinion the important thing is that the Soviet Union should have accepted the principle of obligatory on-site inspection, and largely in response to Western appeals. We still think, therefore, that the Soviet offer must be the object of real appreciation on the part of the two Western partners, who should be able to match it, in token of their appreciation, by a similar spirit on their part. And indeed that is the impression we have already gained from listening to Mr. Foster and Mr. Godber. The latter made it crystal clear in his statement of 15 February (ENDC/PV.98, p. 42 et seq.) that the Western position is very flexible and that as far as the West is concerned the remaining issues are all negotiable. We welcome his appeal to keep the door open and his invitation to the non-aligned nations to try their hand once again at compromise solutions.

Let me now review briefly the main points of initial accord on certain important issues which were recorded in the letters exchanged. They established agreement in principle on the utilization of the "black boxes" in addition to national observation stations. They also envisaged the possibility of establishing some such stations in seismic as well as in aseismic areas, subject to agreed and legitimate security arrangements. And, finally, they established that further discussion entailed and necessitated "further technical development". The United States President conceded, furthermore, that Mr. Khrushchev's suggestions had given rise to the hope that they would prove "helpful in starting us down the road to an agreement" (ENDC/74, p.1). Indeed, one cannot imagine that any insurmountable difficulty should exist now that both parties agree on all the fundamental issues relative to a test ban, which have already been enumerated by previous speakers. As pointed out earlier, further additional points of accommodation have been recorded in the correspondence exchanged.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

We had also found an added ray of hope in Mr. Kennedy's announcement on 26 January of the suspension of underground tests during the bilateral and tripartite exchanges of views (ENDC/PV.96, p.34). Even after the suspension of those exchanges and pending their resumption here in Geneva we had hoped, and indeed expected, that the United States Government would continue to honour its voluntary suspension of underground tests. For one thing, tripartite talks had not been irreparably damaged, but were merely suspended, to be resumed here among the three as well as among the seventeen, if need be. For another, the test carried out by the United States at Nevada on 8 February 1963 unfortunately constitutes the first such test to be conducted despite the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) which appealed to all nuclear Powers to refrain from conducting any nuclear tests after 1 January 1963. Regrettable as this may be, we would still formulate the hope that the last mentioned test was meant to be an isolated one, intended mainly for seemingly expedient political considerations and not as a part of a future test series. In either case it must indeed be regrettable; and we would therefore appeal to the other nuclear Powers to show more forbearance and to rise above the temptation to reciprocate in kind, in order to safeguard the chances of the success of our test ban negotiations.

So much for the review of developments before 12 February 1963. Let me now turn to the work of this session. We have listened with great attention to the explanations given by the nuclear Powers as well as to the other speakers who have preceded me. It would now seem to me, in the light of what we heard, that not enough progress was made at the New York-Washington talks, or, more correctly, that those talks did not really get off to a serious start because of a difference of approach.

The Soviet Union's thesis would seem to run along these lines: that its offer of three inspections per year is an important concession and that the difference between three on-site inspections suggested by it and eight suggested by the Western partners (ENDC/74, p.2) is more of a political than of a scientific nature, and is irrelevant because either figure represents only a fraction of the yearly unidentified events: according to Mr. Khrushchev himself, either figure has mainly a psychological deterrent value. The Soviet Union considers it spurious and superfluous to get bogged down on this political point, or to seek an endless technical discussion before first agreeing on this initial political point. As a non-aligned country,

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

we can appreciate the strength of the Russian feelings on this matter. We can sympathize with the view that negotiations need not and should not get bogged down in endless details.

The Western partners, on the other hand, while not denying the basic truth of a theory of surprise-deterrent visits, contend -- also with some degree of persuasiveness, to our mind --- that, from the Western viewpoint, eight visits might have more deterrence value than five or three; and that is more important, or even more important, to make sure before committing themselves to any number that, whatever the number of visits, they have to be made meaningful and serve as a deterrent and not be a mere number on paper.

Not having had the benefit of participating in the New York tripartite discussions, our mind is not very clear about some of those issues. As a non-nuclear, non-aligned State lacking the technical facilities of the nuclear super-Powers and the answers to the many technical questions which they pose, we therefore should want to ask the nuclear Powers to give some clarification of certain of their views and positions. We hope they will take our questions in the spirit of the sincere and serious endeavours by which they are actually motivated.

From our private talks with certain delegations we understand that the 1959 test ban talks had almost reached an understanding on these technical details which, apart from the number of visits, the West now wants to begin by studying. We would hope that this could be confirmed and remain true; because, if that were so, then the difficulties which lie ahead might actually be smaller than one would think.

Another question is this: is not the acceptance of two or three inspections per year tantamount to admitting that they can be made consistent with a State's national security and that they need not necessarily represent harmful interference? Could it not prove possible or within a State's capabilities to accept for example a maximum of four to five visits under the same security arrangements? And, conversely, does not the acceptance of the theory and principle of inspection of only a fraction, let us say one-fifth, of unidentified events --- on the valid theory that what was needed was not the discovery of every violation but, more logically and practically, inhibiting or deterring violation by creating risks of discovery --- and the offer of eight such visits per year amount in fact to tacitly admitting that the acceptance of one-seventh or one-eighth of unidentified events, let us suppose five or four visits, should not very much affect the general picture of a few surprise-deterrent visits?

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

By the same token, could it be denied that during the last two rounds the West kept prodding the Soviet Union to accept just the principle of on-site inspection because only a very small number would be needed, anyway?

We feel that any honest and straightforward answer to the above questions will show how close we have come to an agreement. It is an absolute necessity that both parties should close this small, final gap. A mutually satisfactory accommodation would, and indeed should, be reached if the parties started negotiating in earnest and if they really felt the need to agree on a test ban, which was the impression given by the letters which were exchanged.

We have asked whether the difference between three and eight was intrinsically important in the sense that the agreed number's greatest usefulness resided in its deterrent value. Does it not follow, I ask, provided one party has the assurance that the visits will not be used for illegitimate activities, and that the other party is satisfied that the number of visits will truly have, and continue to have, the desired effective deterrent value, that the number of visits becomes just a symbol devoid of any charm or magic? We would be interested to learn from any delegation in a better position to know whether there is anything especially significant or sacred, politically or scientifically, about either figure of three or eight.

In this rather hasty review of the two parties' positions on the matter we are not taking sides or favouring any one viewpoint against the other, for we know only too well how gallantly each party can defend its position. My main objective was to give here another dimension or perspective of the matter as seen by detached and uncommitted observers. We feel it to be our duty, as we said earlier, to acquaint the Conference with the views of that segment of world opinion.

One final question. It may be remembered that my delegation suggested on a few occasions that the nuclear Powers should turn to the study of the question: "When should on-site inspection be necessary in practice?" (ENDC/PV.70, p.24) We have noticed with no small amount of interest that Chairman Khrushchev was of the same opinion when he offered in his letter of 19 December 1962 (ENDC/73, p.5) to accept two or three on-site inspections a year "when it was considered necessary". Again we were pleased to see that Mr. Kuznetsov repeated the same idea on 12 February when he said that the Soviet Government agreed to carry out two or three inspections annually

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

"in cases where this was considered necessary". (ENDC/PV.96, p.22) We do not remind the Conference of the similarity of approach by way of boasting or bragging; rather, our intention is merely to point out that the detached and non-committed approach, by its very nature, is more capable of seeking compromise solutions which might ultimately turn out to be acceptable, even though they might look far-fetched or too ambitious at the time.

Now our question is, "When should on-site inspection be necessary in practice?" --- and we are not aware that anyone has given an answer to that question, which we first put on 15 August 1962. If the discussions which took place in New York and Washington -- of which we naturally are not fully informed -- resulted in agreement about that question, would it be possible to acquaint the Committee with the outcome, since it might have a bearing on the present situation?

As to the specific difference about which should take place first -- agreement on the number of the quota of inspections or the definition of what constitutes inspection and agreement on the modalities therefore --- quite a few possible compromise solutions may be found. The non-aligned States should not find it beyond their resourcefulness to come forward with various suggestions. It might be suggested, for example, that we could ask the party which should be so inclined to submit a new draft test ban treaty incorporating its ideas and formulations. Yet another suggestion might be to ask each party to submit first a working paper elaborating the outlines of its thinking on the question of a test ban, a procedure which was chosen and put to advantage on a few previous occasions by all three nuclear Powers alike. Or it might still be suggested that we adopt with regard to the test ban treaty the same procedure we have agreed to follow in our formulation of a joint draft disarmament treaty.

The different proposals about the quota number could be discussed prior to and simultaneously with other pertinent components of a draft test ban treaty. They are all laid down in the same paper, a process which may facilitate agreement and have the benefit of limiting the frame of the discussions. An early or preliminary possible agreement on the quota number would be welcome; but failing an immediate agreement the suggested quota numbers could be left between one, two, or three brackets. That could allow the study of the other pertinent components of the system to go on under what we might call a natural built-in limitation, in time and

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

space, due to the size and nature of the paper itself. It might also guarantee that discussion would not get bogged down in endless details. A time-limit might even be set on the duration of such a discussion.

All of the above illustrations might result in simultaneous and orderly discussion of both sides of the issue. There would be no need to go on arguing about which should come first. Both should be laid on the table at the same time.

We are not submitting any of these illustrations, however, because we do not feel they could be useful in the absence of the political will of one and all to reach a quick settlement. We have seen how the ingenious bracket idea in relation to the draft treaty on disarmament has led only to a war of brackets. We know, however, that the world will not be satisfied with another test ban war of brackets, which would officially usher the cold war into the test ban negotiations, while the armament race went on, heralding the advent of yet newer members to the nuclear club, each with a new bang.

We are convinced that only the nuclear partners --- and possibly only at the highest level --- can find solutions to those problems, solutions which they will be ready and willing to implement. We do not tend to underestimate the real difficulties which they may still encounter. To our mind these are both political and psychological. They have to do more with confidence -- or the lack of confidence --- and with national prestige. Yet we do not ask the partners to sacrifice any element of their national security. Rather, we appeal to them to throw overboard, to sacrifice, so to speak, some of their mutual residual suspicions and to seek equally honourable compromises.

Guided by the newly-generated post-Cuban spirit of practicality and reviving confidence, could they not help one another to get rid of some of that over-hanging suspicion? All we can say in that regard is that we see the whole difference boiling down to an act of faith. One party should reassure the other that the number of the quota of inspections which it suggests would be really meaningful, and that it would act as an effective deterrent against violation. The other party should dispel any lingering fears and seek to give assurance that surprise deterrent visits would not have, and could not be made to have, other ulterior significance. Both parties need to assure one another that practicality rather than politics is the driving force behind their proposals. If those assurances are exchanged at the outset, there should be no need nor any place for the difference about which came



(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

first, the chicken or the egg. But we should not allow the initial difficulty about the quota figure to inhibit or, worse still, to deter our progress to a test ban agreement. We might risk the danger of giving the wrong impression that we were hiding behind the "numbers game" for extraneous reasons.

Now, however, the nuclear parties face their greatest challenge since the beginning of this Conference. They will not be able to convince the world of their sincerity of purpose, they will not be able to silence their detractors who described our whole endeavour, even before it started, as an "exercise in futility" if they do not find, and quickly, a permanent settlement to the test ban problem. Nor can we envisage any real progress in the harder and longer disarmament negotiations if we do not take this initial and easier step. Can it be said that we will be able to discuss fruitfully and constructively, for example, Mr. Gromyko's very important modification about the method of reduction of delivery vehicles (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.5; A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38), or the United States paper on the reduction of the risks of war (ENDC/70), if we do not convince ourselves that we truly have the seriousness of purpose and the will to negotiate? Do the above-mentioned disarmament problems or other disarmament problems lend themselves to a "take it or leave it" approach?

I feel it my duty, however, to state frankly that our study of disarmament problems, in the absence of the long-cherished and now feasible test ban agreement, or at least in the absence of favourable signs for its solution, will remain, to say the least, largely academic.

I would not end this statement without referring to collateral measures. There is every indication on the international horizon that a break-through on the suspension of the tests issue could now, more than ever, cause a very happy chain reaction which might facilitate agreement on a pre-stage-I package deal, comprising such interrelated measures as we have had occasion to suggest in previous statements.

I have been instructed by my Government to appeal to the nuclear Powers and to remind them not only of their moral obligations but indeed of their basic unity of purpose in preventing the proliferation of atomic weapons, as well as of our common interest in keeping this forum of negotiation going. Rather than capitalize on what seem to be points of weakness in the position of the other party, each should try to understand and sympathize with the difficulties of the other. My Government believes that no positive agreement between equally great Powers can be based on anything but a position of equality in honour.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

A high degree of statesmanship, of courage and of political maturity is now needed to finish off swiftly the negotiations which did not come to fruition in New York. We should be happy if the nuclear Powers decided to use the forum of the Sub-Committee or, for that matter, even the Conference itself. We have no objection to their making simultaneous use of any other channel available at whatever level, as long as they resume serious and dedicated talks aiming at telling this Conference, and the sooner the better, that the road to signing a test ban agreement is now clear.

We thought, and are still convinced, that Mr. Khrushchev's welcome initiative in his correspondence to Mr. Kennedy was a courageous act of good faith and statesmanship. Any newer act of mutual accommodation - and we expect this from one party and the other - in order to help find a solution to this last obstacle will to our mind be further proof of even greater good will, moral courage and higher statesmanship, which the whole world should acclaim.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Today I wish to speak again about what we regard as the most immediate task for the Conference at this time, namely, to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty. Before doing so, however, I am compelled to answer briefly certain attacks on United States policy made by the Soviet Union and by some of its allies last week and again this morning. Those attacks have centred on the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force and the alleged transfer of control over nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Powers. They simply delay us in coming to grips with the problems of negotiating promptly a safeguarded nuclear test ban treaty and the other measures before this Conference. Whether or not so intended, they distract us from our more important tasks.

United States policy is firmly against the transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of States which do not possess them. This policy has been expressed in our internal legislation, in our support of the Irish resolution (1665 (XVI)) in the General Assembly, in our submission to this Conference on 18 April 1962 of our plan (ENDC/30 and Add.1,2) for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, and in numerous speeches and discussions since.

No arrangement for a NATO multilateral nuclear force proposed at Nassau or elsewhere would violate this long-standing United States policy. Indeed, such a force would serve this policy by giving our allies a voice in nuclear strategy.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

It would thereby remove whatever incentive might conceivably exist for those who do not now have nuclear weapons to seek to acquire an independent nuclear capability.

Nor is the recent Franco-German treaty of co-operation concerned with nuclear weapons. As President Kennedy remarked at his Press conference on 7 February, Germany would remain bound by its 1954 treaty obligation renouncing nuclear weapons. We, for our part, regard the Franco-German reconciliation and co-operation as a contribution to peace and stability in the world, particularly in Europe.

I should like now to return to the problem of a test ban. As I have indicated, we agree with the first priority which the representatives of Canada, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic have allotted to achieving a test ban. We welcome the constructive comments made by the representative of the United Arab Republic this morning in outlining some methods of helping to achieve such an agreement. Also, I take it from the emphasis which our Brazilian colleague placed on the test ban in his intervention on 15 February (ENDC/PV.98, pp. 13 et seq.) that he also views the achievement of a treaty as our most immediate task at this time. To build on a metaphor which he used, the ice of distrust could be broken and then melted away by the warm sun of confidence engendered by a sound and safeguarded test ban treaty.

In order to achieve our most immediate goal of a nuclear test ban treaty we should devote our time and attention to a serious exploration of the major issues that must be resolved in order to reach agreement. From our point of view that was the objective of the talks that were held in New York and Washington. We have agreed in principle on three important verification elements: national systems, automatic stations, and on-site inspections. I was happy to have confirmation of that from the Polish representative in his remarks this morning. Today my purpose is to talk about the last of those elements - on-site inspections. In other meetings later we hope to discuss the other elements.

We appreciate Chairman Khrushchev's reaffirmation, after a hiatus of more than a year, of Soviet willingness to accept a quota of on-site inspections. We saw in that movement a genuine desire to move towards a test ban agreement. I repeat: we evaluated the Soviet offer of two or three on-site inspections as evidence of a real willingness to open negotiations designed to reach an effective test ban agreement. We did not assume the number mentioned by Chairman Khrushchev to be an ultimatum which the United States had no choice but to accept. As I pointed out (ENDC/PV.96 p.13) in the first meeting of this session of the Conference, the Soviet

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Union was fully aware, even before the start of the recess talks, that the United States could not accept only two or three on-site inspections.

Our confidence in that assumption was strengthened when the Soviet Union accepted our suggestion of private talks. The Soviet Union accepted the suggestion contained in President Kennedy's letter of 23 December 1962 (ENDC/74), which itself referred to the United States position that 8 to 10 on-site inspections were required. That same communication expressed the President's hope that the Soviet Union would match our movement, which had brought our requirement down from the 12 to 20 sliding scale, with an equivalent movement upward from the figure of two or three inspections which the Soviet Union had accepted until 23 November 1961.

It was therefore a very real surprise when, in the first meeting of the recess talks, we were told literally that the Soviet Union would not negotiate on the question of numbers of on-site inspections above two or three. Presumably the whole intent of the private talks, in the Soviet view, was solely to record agreement on the particular Soviet proposals put forward. Understandably, that has shaken our belief that the Soviet Union really desires agreement. Nevertheless we still continue to act on the assumption that an appropriate quota number can be agreed upon within the framework of a treaty, the major features of which must necessarily be satisfactory to all parties concerned.

For the United States, the ability to carry out effectively an annual quota of on-site inspections has been a key element in the verification system. We see no way other than by effective inspection to allay the uncertainties, suspicions and ill-will which would otherwise arise over the months and years. Our scientists advise us that seismograph records alone simply will not do this for a considerable number of earth tremors each year. We therefore believe we need, first, an inspection quota that allows inspection of some reasonable proportion of these unidentified events; and, secondly, a set of principles governing on-site inspections which will ensure that each on-site inspection can be meaningful.

There have been many advances in the science of seismology, but our scientists tell us that there are still a good many earth tremors each year in the Soviet Union about the origin of which they have no evidence. The seismographs give no indication whether those tremors are due to earthquakes or to explosions. Only

(Mr. Foster, United States)

an on-site inspection could tell. We do not ask that all of those earth tremors be inspected. All we ask is that there should be inspection of a reasonable proportion of them. We believe that eight to ten is a reasonable if small proportion. Three would not only be far too small a proportion: it would be patently inadequate even if the unidentified earth tremors were many fewer than our scientists say.

Under any quota, one and perhaps two inspections would have to be saved until the end of the year to provide a deterrent against tests all the year long. That means that a quota of three might well provide only one usable inspection for most of the year. How can it be said that one usable inspection each year could allay suspicions and promote the confidence we all recognize is needed, particularly when there would be a sizable number of earth tremors to which the quota would be applied?

The Soviet Government professes to think that the United States only requires inspections as a political gratuity to satisfy certain "internal" interests within the United States. For that purpose the Soviet Government implies that it estimates the quota number of three to be sufficient. That is a miscalculation from beginning to end. The reason that on-site inspections are a political necessity is that they are, first and foremost, based on a technical requirement. We have asked the Soviet Government to respect our judgement on this. We have explained the numerous reasons which impel us to this view. We cannot insist that the Soviet Government publicly adopt those reasons, but we can in good faith ask it to understand them and to realize that we must continue to be guided by them. In this connexion I appreciate the recognition by the representative of Brazil that technical problems are important here, and his renewed suggestion that technical studies by an ad hoc group of experts might run concurrently with our political discussions (ENDC/PV.98, p.17).

I should like to say a few words about the reasons why we have attempted to discuss the elements of an on-site inspection. In my statement at our opening meeting (ENDC/PV.96, p.14) I assured the Soviet Union that the United States and the United Kingdom had no interest in prolonging our negotiations through a discussion of technical details of secondary and subsidiary importance. We agree with the Soviet Union that the major features of a test ban agreement ought to be worked out first, and that it should then be a relatively easy task to fill in the details. Where the two sides apparently differ now is over those features which should be

(Mr. Foster, United States)

considered as essential to any agreement and which must, therefore, be resolved immediately. The Soviet Union has continued to insist that, before any other matters can even be discussed, the West must agree to the specific figures proposed by the Soviet Union with respect to a quota of on-site inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations.

The United States and the United Kingdom have what we consider to be a broader and more balanced point of view about these matters. Indeed, the long history of these negotiations has taught us that all the main provisions concerning inspections must be viewed as a whole and that the annual number of inspections is but one of these major provisions. How can we tell that an annual quota of inspections would be adequate unless we know how meaningful each inspection would be? It is like asking us to say how much we would agree to pay for a meal in a far-away place where we had never been, without telling us what there might be for us to eat, whether we should have any choice in the selection of the food, whether the food would be for us alone or primarily for someone else, whether there would even be minimal agreed standards concerning how the food was preserved and prepared, how we should get to the eating place and what arrangements would be made for serving the food when we arrived there. No one would think of entering into such an arrangement. Similarly, we need to know the following:

First: How are potentially suspicious earth tremors located, and what criteria can be used to classify at least some of them as earthquakes and not explosions? We have proposed scientific formulae to answer those questions. Up to 28 November 1961 the Soviet Union proposed similar formulae, with one important exception. Has it now accepted our formulae or returned to its own, or has it others to propose?

Second: Of the remaining potentially-suspicious earth tremors, who chooses which ones to inspect within the quota? We were in apparent agreement before 28 November 1961 that each side would begin the process by choosing the events in the other side's territory. What is the present Soviet position?

Third: How big is the area which may be inspected? We have made several proposals on this score, but we do not know the Soviet position.

Fourth: Who will do the inspecting? We have proposed that no United States national inspect United States territory and that no Soviet national inspect Soviet territory. We have made other proposals concerning how the team should be

(Mr. Foster, United States)

composed. Until 28 November 1961 the Soviet Union proposed that inspection teams on its territory be made up one-half of Soviet nationals, one of whom would lead the team. We have made it clear repeatedly that this proposal, since it constituted self-inspection, was not acceptable. What is the present Soviet position on the matter?

Fifth: How would the inspection be carried out? We have proposed that an inspection team be promptly dispatched and that it search for radioactive debris and other evidence by means of low-level aerial inspection and intensive ground inspection, which might include drilling. The Soviet Union, before 28 November 1961, apparently agreed to such procedures in principle. Does it now?

Transit to the site of the inspection would be subject to safeguards to ensure that the teams proceeded speedily and promptly to the site of the event with an absolute minimum of interference to the normal activities of the host country. Special arrangements of the kind we have frequently discussed might be agreed upon to ensure the host country's national security during transit of the inspection team. Operations at the site could be monitored by host-country observers, and the United States would be pleased to discuss arrangements with regard to areas particularly sensitive from the standpoint of national security. All of those procedures have been explained to the Soviet Union, but we have thus far received no reply concerning their suitability and acceptability to the Soviet Government.

General answers at least to those problems are crucial if we are to make tangible progress towards a test ban agreement. Our general proposals on those questions are on the table. They have been touched upon by me today, and it is our urgent desire to enter into real discussions with the Soviet Union on them; for, in the long run, reaching an effective agreement will depend upon acceptance by both sides, not only of quota numbers for inspections but also of the measures which will ensure that inspections will be meaningfully carried out.

It is my delegation's earnest hope that these issues can be discussed quickly and intensively during the days ahead. That is why my delegation is here. We are prepared to discuss and consider with the Soviet Union all possible means of resolving any of these questions, upon which it may have its own suggestions or proposals to make. Our sole aim is to reach swiftly an effective nuclear test ban agreement.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

In closing, I wish to refer to the remarks of Secretary of State Rusk at the very beginning of this Conference last year - remarks which are as true today as they were then. He said that the cessation of nuclear weapon tests was a matter which "should yield priority to none." Our objective, he stated, was to see nuclear weapon tests "stopped, and stopped forever." (ENDC/PV.2, p.23). He continued:

"This is why the United States and the United Kingdom have invited the Soviet Union to resume negotiations to ban all nuclear weapons tests under effective international controls. We shall press this matter here at Geneva and make every reasonable effort to conclude an agreement which can bring an end to testing." (ibid.)

President Kennedy has said repeatedly that the United States desires a safeguarded agreement to end nuclear weapon tests. As he said most recently on the occasion of the opening of this session of the Conference:

"We must seek an agreement that will serve the world's real interests by deserving and promoting confidence and trust among the nations." (ENDC/PV.96, p.8)

We are here to continue our search for such an agreement.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I propose to detain my colleagues for only a very few moments this morning. I had originally intended to make a speech on a number of items related to the more general issues of general and complete disarmament, and in particular to take up certain points made last week by various representatives. Listening to this morning's debate, however, I have come to the conclusion that such a speech this morning would be inappropriate in that almost the whole attention of those who have spoken before me has been devoted to nuclear tests; and it seems to me that it would be a pity, therefore, to mar the debate by taking it away from that subject at this moment. There will be an opportunity another day for me to come back to those other wider issues, and I therefore reserve my position at the moment, if I may. I would have withdrawn my name but that I wish to comment very briefly on one or two points that have emerged this morning.

First, I should like to express my pleasure at seeing Mr. Naszkowski back with us again to lead the Polish delegation. I wish I could express equal warmth for everything he said to us this morning, but there were some things I found of definite



(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

interest. I felt that perhaps if he had heard some of my own comments last week I might have persuaded him not to say one or two of the things he said today. In regard to the point he made when speaking of nuclear tests - I think I noted his words correctly - he talked of the West's desire to use the wish to compromise on the part of the other side to impose its own views (supra, p.7 ). I think this point was very effectively dealt with by our United States colleague in the speech to which we have just listened when he pointed out that in fact if it is a case of imposing wills it is not the Western side which is seeking to do that (supra, p.20 ). We have always been ready to seek genuine compromise on matters which can be substantiated as providing evident and effective control over any nuclear test ban treaty. It is not a question of seeking to dictate; it is a question of accepting a genuine scientific basis in which both sides can have confidence. It is not a one-sided issue at all. However, that is only a passing comment.

I was very struck by the speech of our United Arab Republic colleague this morning. It was remarkable in its content and it deserves our closest study. It would obviously be wrong for me to say I agreed with every single sentence of what he said. Nevertheless, there was a great deal in it which I found we ought all to analyse closely to see whether it could help us forward towards that agreement which, he so rightly says, must be the desire of us all. I for one certainly propose to give it very careful thought indeed. That is not merely because he did me the honour of quoting me in the early stages of his speech, gratified though I was that he should do so. But perhaps I might take up the point he made in relation to my urging our Soviet colleagues at that time to accept again the principle of obligatory on-site inspection. I have since said that we welcome the fact that they have so accepted it, and that puts us in a negotiating position now where at least the bases on which both sides approach this question are similar. Our colleagues round the table know only too well that throughout the whole of our discussions here last year we were in the impossible negotiating position on this particular issue where the two sides did not have a similar basis on which to negotiate, but the re-acceptance of obligatory on-site inspection by the Soviet Union does open up those possibilities.

The speech of our United States colleague this morning drew clearly from this, I think, the points on which we now need to seek to make progress. The points which he has enumerated so clearly in the speech to which we have just listened will remind us all, I hope, of the various problems that face us, which of course are not solely confined to these particular questions of numbers.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Towards the end of his speech our colleague from the United Arab Republic said he would be happy if the nuclear Powers decided to use the forum of the nuclear Sub-Committee or even the Conference itself and he made certain other suggestions. My own feeling is that there would be definite advantage, since we have this new basis for negotiation, if the Sub-Committee were to meet again at an early date, and I hope that this will be agreed to. If we could get a genuine desire to come to terms on these various issues on both sides, it is my belief that we ought to be able to clinch this matter. I tried to set out the position on this matter as simply as I could in the speech I made to the Conference on Friday (ENDC/PV.98, pp.42 et seq.). I tried to set it out precisely and concisely, and I do not think I would wish to add more to it at this stage. Therefore, as I say, I only kept my name on the list of speakers this morning because I wished to express my interest in the very thoughtful speech our United Arab Republic colleague made to us this morning and to assure him that as far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned it will receive our very careful consideration.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, I should like to welcome the representative of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. We paid careful attention to the useful contribution to our common cause which the representative of Poland made in his statement today. We also listened with interest to the considerations put forward by the representative of the United Arab Republic and in our subsequent statements we shall try to answer the questions put by Mr. Hassan. We also listened most attentively to the statement made today by the United States representative. Unfortunately that statement contained a number of points with which we cannot possibly agree.

Attempts are being made by the United States side to distort the position of the Soviet Union on a number of issues. The United States representative today said nothing new on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. There was no evidence of any desire on his part to take advantage of the favourable conditions for the immediate conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all tests which have been created as a result of the constructive steps taken by the Soviet Union. We can only regret that the question of the number of inspections has been turned into an obstacle to agreement on the cessation of tests.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Yet this is a question which, in essence, had already been solved. The stubborn determination of our Western partners to bargain for the greatest possible number of inspections, which are quite unnecessary for control purposes, cannot fail to put us on our guard. It is evident that hidden behind this demand are other intentions, which have nothing to do with control over nuclear explosions. With all due respect to Mr. Foster, I feel obliged to dwell on his example of an eating place and its prices which he adduced to prove the necessity for a larger number of on-site inspections. This example is unsuitable and irrelevant to the problems we are discussing. The arguments which the Western Powers are now putting forward in an attempt to justify a larger number of inspections do not provide any convincing proof. It has been demonstrated here on many occasions that the number of inspections cannot be determined on the basis of a so-called scientific approach. These are two different levels. It would be all the same if, let us say, taking the example you have mentioned, you were to enumerate all the dishes served in the restaurant and were then to ask, for instance, the age of the restaurant owner and the name of his wife. There is no relation between one and the other; and the same applies to your attempts to determine the number of inspections on the basis of certain special scientific and technical considerations.

Of course, we firmly reject attempts to lay upon the Soviet Union the responsibility for the situation which has arisen in the negotiations on this question. We shall study the statement Mr. Foster made today, and at a meeting of the Committee in the near future we shall give an appropriate reply to the questions that were touched upon and we shall state the Soviet Union's position on them.

At present I should like to dwell briefly on one question on which we think it appropriate to make a few remarks immediately in connexion with the statement made by Mr. Foster today. That is the question of the plans of the Western Powers for the further spread of nuclear weapons, which are dangerous to the cause of peace. Mr. Foster denied the existence of such plans among the Western Powers and asserted, in particular, that the plan to create a NATO multilateral force would not lead to the further spread of nuclear weapons. (supra, p.18) We consider this to be a very important matter, which has a direct bearing on the negotiations in this Committee, since it is obvious that any activities aiming at the further spread of nuclear weapons are bound to aggravate the whole international situation, to increase the threat of a

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

nuclear war and, obviously, to make the negotiations on disarmament more difficult. It is therefore impossible to agree with the assertion that to refer to and discuss this matter would lead us away from considering the problems before our Committee. We must take into account what is now happening in the world. We cannot isolate our Committee within four walls and ignore what is happening in the world and not distinguish between what contributes to the fulfilment of the tasks assigned to it and what hinders their fulfilment. It is our duty to take steps to eliminate the obstacles which hinder our work.

With regard to the question whether the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral force will lead to the further spread of nuclear weapons, a perfectly clear situation is taking shape: the giving of access to nuclear weapons to States which hitherto have not possessed them will mean the further spread of nuclear weapons - no other result can be expected, nor can it be called anything else. Moreover, the plan for the creation of a "NATO multilateral nuclear force" provides for such access through two channels, so to speak.

In the first place, it is evident from statements made by responsible United States persons that the intention is to place submarines with Polaris missiles under the control of mixed commands, including military personnel of both nuclear and non-nuclear NATO Powers. Surely no one can believe that the military personnel of the non-nuclear Powers will be concerned only with swabbing decks or chipping rust off anchors. No, they will of course be directly concerned with the Polaris missiles, which, as we all know, have thermonuclear warheads of great destructive capacity.

Secondly, the statements of responsible United States officials also show that consideration is now being given to the creation of a special organ in NATO, with the participation of both nuclear and non-nuclear States members of this bloc, which will take decisions on the military use of the NATO multilateral nuclear force, that is to say, on firing the Polaris in the direction of predetermined targets in the territories of the socialist countries. Moreover, the possibility of taking such decisions by a majority, and not unanimously, is not excluded.

In the light of all this, what are we to think- is it or is it not proposed to give access to nuclear weapons to those who do not yet possess them, through the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force? It is obvious that the answer to this must be in the affirmative. In fact, the President of the United States of

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

America already gave this answer when he said the following at his press conference on 14 February:

"We are, as you know, putting forward and have suggested a multilateral force as well as a multi-national force, which will, I think, substantially increase the influence that the Europeans have in the atomic field". (New York Times, 15 February 1963).

As you see, the words speak for themselves. Yet here the representatives of the NATO countries are trying to convince the members of the Committee that nothing of the kind will happen and that the West European States members of NATO will not be given access to nuclear weapons, even within the framework of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. If the situation were really as you say it is, the President of the United States of America would have no reason to speak of a substantial increase of the influence of the European members of NATO in the field of nuclear weapons. But then there would also be no sense in creating a multilateral nuclear force, and yet for some reason it is being created.

Surely we cannot really believe that the purpose of this whole plan is simply to create an illusion among the West European States members of NATO that they are being given greater influence in nuclear weapon matters, whereas in actual fact no such influence is being given them. Can anyone seriously assert that the creation of a multilateral nuclear force is to be regarded as a step intended to delude the non-nuclear NATO powers and to give them, in fact, nothing? That sort of thing does not happen in politics. We are faced with actual attempts to disseminate nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union obviously cannot fail to pay attention to this important step directed against its security and the security of all socialist countries. The Soviet Government will be compelled to draw the appropriate conclusions in order to ensure the security of the USSR and of its allies.

Of course, all those who do not want war are particularly alarmed by the fact that, within the framework of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, access to nuclear weapons will be given to Western Germany, whose revanchist aspirations are well known. The United States and United Kingdom representatives will, of course, say that this is a very limited access and is subject to control. But the peoples are already familiar with all this: first, the West German revanchists and militarists will be given one outwardly small concession, and there will be talk about control. Then they will get another, slightly larger concession. Then even

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

further concessions will be made to them and when you look, it will be hard to determine who is the real master of the situation, those who make the concessions, or the West Germany revanchists themselves. The history of the post-war rearmament of Western Germany is full of convincing and generally-known examples of this kind.

We cannot fail to recall also that the theory according to which predatory German militarism and revanchism can be tamed by means of gradual concessions was, as we all know, widely entertained in the Western countries during the period following the First World War. But the peoples will never forget the practical results to which this theory led at that time and how short was the road from the Munich Conference to the ruins of Coventry and Smolensk, to the furnaces of Majdanek and the bales of human hair at Auschwitz. And now, how many years will it take for events to develop from the time when the revanchists and militarists of the Federal Republic of Germany are given access to nuclear weapons within a NATO multilateral nuclear force, to the day when they will involve mankind in a nuclear adventure? And how many hundreds of millions of victims will this adventure cost the peoples? Are you prepared to answer these questions, gentlemen, the representatives of the NATO countries which are by their actions facilitating the equipping of German militarism with nuclear weapons?

We should like to stress once again that we are speaking about very serious matters indeed. The future of the peoples is at stake, and we therefore cannot fail to raise the alarm.

Moreover, it is no secret that the plans of the West German militarists are directed towards obtaining nuclear weapons and are not limited to participation in a "NATO multilateral nuclear force". There is also the military treaty between two partners in NATO, France and Western Germany. The organizers of this military union do not conceal the fact that they intend to improve their weapons together and to prepare a joint strategy for their use. In my last intervention, I mentioned President de Gaulle's statement that the West German State could have any weapons which it deemed necessary. Is it not obvious what a danger this is to peace throughout the world? The representatives of the Western Powers avoid giving in this Committee a proper appraisal of the military treaty between France and Western Germany. But on this account the treaty will not become any less dangerous, nor will it cease to be an instrument for the actual transfer of nuclear

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

weapons to the revanchists and militarists of Western Germany. This is a fact, and no one will seriously try to deny that the widening of the area of location of nuclear weapons is a danger to the cause of peace.

All this only confirms again and again the thought shared by the overwhelming majority of delegations here in this Committee, namely that we cannot delay to carry out measures which would reverse the trend of events in the direction of reducing the threat of a nuclear war and eliminating the danger which hangs over the peoples. It is the profound conviction of the Soviet Government that, among the measures which would help to create favourable conditions for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, the first would be renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, and the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world.

The Soviet Government is in favour of the speediest adoption and implementation of these measures, and we should like to express the hope that the Committee will proceed in the near future to their practical consideration.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): At the present stage of this discussion I will confine myself to a few words. I should like simply to make a few brief remarks on the exchange of views which has taken place so far, and on some interesting points which I think have emerged.

As indeed the Italian delegation hoped, the discussion while remaining general has been to a great extent concerned with an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. That confirms once again the urgency and importance of this problem, which is in a sense an obligatory road to progressively wider disarmament measures and finally to general and complete disarmament. I will not enter into the details of the different positions, but one point - an extremely important one - seems to me to have been unanimously agreed. It is that all of us here round this table are convinced that now is the best moment for the conclusion of an agreement on tests.

I do not wish to spend time now discussing who deserves the main credit for the rapprochement of views which has taken place. What I wish to stress now, and with satisfaction, is that the delegations of the socialist countries have also

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

clearly admitted during the general debate that at the resumption of this Conference the prospects for the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests seem more favourable than they did at the last session.

In his speech on Friday last Mr. Kuznetsov made the following statement:

"It can be said without exaggeration that never before have there been such favourable conditions for solving the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests as there are at the present time. We must not lose the opportunity which is now offered to us, because the international situation might change, and then the conditions might not be so favourable ..."  
(ENDC/PV.98, p.41)

I fully agree with him. But after that I cannot help being surprised to hear Mr. Kuznetsov and all his colleagues of the socialist countries' delegations paint a sombre picture of the international situation and at the same time accuse the Western Powers of acting in a manner dangerous to the peace and stability of the world.

Mr. Kuznetsov has returned to the charge today with some extremely serious criticisms of the intentions and actions of the Western countries - criticisms which are completely unfounded, as Mr. Foster has shown very clearly this morning. On Friday last we heard Mr. Kuznetsov state that the Western Powers wish to use the Geneva Conference to ensnare and deceive the peoples of the world, who are being persuaded that they are on the road to disarmament and peace, whereas the NATO countries are only preparing secret plans for war and destruction.

Those statements are regrettable. If we desire good results from these negotiations, if we wish to succeed, a minimum of confidence and mutual esteem must exist between us all. We believe that the negotiations to which we have been summoned, and to which the countries not belonging to military alliances have generously committed themselves, are serious and honest negotiations. Since we do not deny the good faith of our partners, we expect our own good faith also to be accepted, and the use of terms and the imputation of motives which may harm our common effort and discredit our Conference to be avoided in our discussions.

But, however that may be, there is one point in particular which I should like to make. The pessimistic and negative remarks about the general political situation which the socialist delegations have made, and to which I have already



(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

referred, clearly contradict the same delegation's statements which I have just quoted - that more favourable conditions exist today for solving the problem of tests. Are those two views compatible? Would the way be open to a nuclear agreement if, as our colleagues in the Socialist delegations maintain, the West were really preparing for aggression? Would a test ban be conceivable if the NATO multilateral force were really, as Mr. Kuznetsov repeated this morning, a means for facilitating the proliferation of nuclear arms? It seems to me quite clear that the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests would have no chance of success - whereas I am convinced that it has a very good chance - if the present international situation were really as dangerous as the socialist countries' delegations, for obvious purposes of polemics and propaganda, make it out to be.

Personally, I am glad to see a feeling of unanimity emerging from our discussions. We must take advantage of the considerable rapprochement which has taken place between our views on tests to press forward with our negotiations. In this connexion I hope that our two co-Chairmen have already started their informal contacts. But I should like to ask the Committee, as Mr. Godber has just done, whether the moment has not come to reconvene the three-Power Sub-Committee and ask it to set to work in a practical and business-like manner. I say this especially after hearing the speech made this morning by the United Arab Republic representative, who put forward some very interesting proposals for our method of work (supra., p.15), and after the speech made by Mr. Foster, who brought to the Conference's attention a list of important problems within the Sub-Committee's competence which it should examine as soon as possible (supra., p.22). I am convinced that it would now be extremely useful to convene the Sub-Committee and I hope that the two co-Chairmen will consider this without delay.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I feel it to be necessary for me to comment on some of the statements made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, and I do regret that he has again seen fit to distract the Committee from what so many of its members considered to be the most important and urgent task before it. He has continued his attack on the policies of the United States,

(Mr. Foster, United States)

quoting President Kennedy at a Press conference of 14 February. I think that if Mr. Kuznetsov will re-study the comments I made this morning it will be clear to him that our idea of the function of the multilateral force fits directly into the long-standing policies of the United States concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We believe that such a force, which will give our allies a voice in nuclear strategy as the President said, would - and I quote my earlier remarks - "thereby remove whatever incentive might conceivably exist for those who do not now have nuclear weapons to seek to acquire an independent nuclear capability". (supra, p.19 ).

I must also particularly deplore that Mr. Kuznetsov passed from that to a general attack on the Federal Republic of Germany. We, and I think all objective peoples, recognize that the Federal Republic of Germany is now a peaceful democracy. It has renounced the use of force for political ends. The armed forces of the Federal Republic are fully integrated into the defensive alliance of NATO in case of any hostilities and, as I indicated earlier, the Federal Republic has, by the treaty of 1954, renounced nuclear weapons completely. I think I must again comment that this sort of attack does not further our work, and I hope that we can get on to the important objectives for which we are here.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): If no other representative wishes to speak at this time I should like, before we pass to the communiqué, to draw the attention of the Committee to the "Geneva Declaration by Members of the International Scientific Community", copies of which have been distributed here this morning.

I understand that, although there are only nine names of signatories which appear in the declaration before us, it has in fact been signed by well over 150 eminent scientists from all over the world - scientists who have assembled in Geneva for the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas.

On behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I should like to express our gratitude to these distinguished scientists for the noble sentiments they have expressed in their individual capacity.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I should merely like to ask whether the communiqué should not contain some reference to the distribution to members of the Committee of the Declaration by the scientists which the Chairman has just mentioned. If there is nothing against it, I think that some reference should be inserted in the communiqué to the receipt of that appeal made by the scientists to this Committee to redouble its efforts and conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its ninety-ninth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva under the chairmanship of Mr. G. Macovescu, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Romania.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, the United Arab Republic, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Italy.

"The Conference expressed its gratitude to the scientists who had signed the 'Geneva Declaration by the Members of International Scientific Community' for the sentiments they had expressed in their individual capacity.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 20 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

